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Raising argument strength using negative evidence 
Abstract 
Intuitively and according to general predictions of similarity-based theories of induction, relevant 
evidence raises argument strength when it is positive and lowers it when it’s negative. Three 
experiments test the hypothesis that argument strength can actually increase when encountering 
negative evidence. Participants made forced choice judgments between (Experiment 1 & 2) or 
sequentially evaluated (Experiment 3) single positive (e.g., Shostakovich’s music causes alpha 
waves in the brain, therefore Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain) and double mixed 
premise arguments (e.g., Shostakovich’s music causes alpha waves in the brain, X’s music DOES 
NOT, therefore Bach’s music causes alpha waves in the brain) where the second premise (i.e., X) 
was either from the same subcategory as the first premise and the conclusion (e.g., Haydn) or 
from a different subcategory (e.g., AC/DC). Negative evidence lowered credence when it applied 
to an item from the same subcategory and rose when it was applied to a different subcategory. 
The results constitute a new constraint on models of induction. 
 
Keywords: Induction, Negative evidence, Categories, Models of induction 
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Introduction 
Everyday reasoning consists for the most part of inductive inference, where induction in its 
broadest sense constitutes an inference to an uncertain conclusion. One strategy to make such an 
inference is to use past experiences—my car has always started, so it’s reliable and will start 
today. Another strategy is to use category membership—my car is a German car, so it’s reliable 
and will start today. Research on induction in psychology has predominately focused on the latter 
of the two. In a typical experimental setup, people are told that one or several categories have a 
particular property and are asked to extend that property to other categories within a given 
domain. Participants, for instance, might be asked to judge how likely it is that Bobcats use 
serotonin as neurotransmitter given that both Tigers and Cougars do (Smith, Shafir & Osherson, 
1993). Numerous phenomena relating to category-based property induction have been 
documented (e.g., Hampton & Cannon, 2004; Heit, 2000, for a summary; Heit, Hahn, & Feeney, 
2004; Rips, 1975) and various models have been proposed to account for people’s judgments of 
inductive arguments like these (e.g., Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007; Heit, 1998; Kemp & 
Tenenbaum, 2009; Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Osherson, et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993).  
In the majority of cases, experimental work and modeling efforts have focused on 
arguments involving positive evidence; premises that state that some entity possesses the to-be-
projected property. In reality though, we do not only receive positive evidence for our 
hypotheses. We are often confronted with negative evidence; evidence that states that some entity 
of the same or a similar category DOES NOT possess the to-be-projected property. For instance, 
in evaluating whether Bobcats use serotonin as neurotransmitter we might find out that Tigers do 
but Cougars do not. How do we integrate the negative evidence and how does it influence our 
judgment about Bobcats?  
Heussen et al., A constraint on models of induction.  Page 4  
In the present paper we are interested in the influence of negative evidence on argument 
strength. More precisely, we are interested in the direction of this influence. Contrary to intuition 
and the general predictions of similarity-based theories of induction, we present evidence that, 
under certain circumstances, negative evidence can actually facilitate the generalization of a 
property.  In what follows, we will identify and discuss in more detail the general assumption that 
negative evidence has a negative effect on argument strength. Then we will present three 
experiments that undermine the universal validity of this assumption. In the General Discussion, 
we address in more detail the implications of these findings for well-known models of induction. 
Monotonicity in inductive reasoning 
In absence of other information, it is generally assumed that generalization relies on similarity 
(Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007; Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975; Shepard, 1987; Sloman, 
1993; Smith, Shafir & Osherson, 1993). In the context of category-based property induction, 
similarity between premise and conclusion categories determines the influence that a premise has 
on argument strength: The more similar the premise and conclusion categories are, the greater the 
influence of the evidence on the conclusion (e.g., Rips, 1975). In evaluating whether Bobcats 
have property x, knowing that Tigers do seems to provide stronger evidence than discovering that 
Penguins do. Moreover, this relation between similarity and arguments has been shown to hold 
for additional premises—discovering that not only Tigers have property x, but also Lions and 
Cats, will further strengthen one’s belief that indeed Bobcats too must have the property. The 
tendency that accumulating further positive premises is positively related to argument strength 
has been referred to as monotonicity in inductive reasoning, and is supported by many empirical 
results (e.g., Feeney, 2007; McDonald, Samuels, & Rispoli, 1996; Osherson et al, 1990, 1991; for 
summaries see, Hayes, Heit & Swendsen, 2010; Heit, 2000). 
Heussen et al., A constraint on models of induction.  Page 5  
Now, what can we expect when negative evidence comes into play? It is important to 
realize that there is no reason to consider not-having-a-property as essentially different from 
having-a-property1. In other words, discovering that Lions do not have property x provides a 
reasonable basis to conclude that Bobcats do not have x, analogously to having a property. 
Obviously, the conclusion that Bobcats do not have x, is inversely related to the conclusion that 
Bobcats have x. Hence Bobcats having x becomes less likely in the light of Lions not having x. 
Following a similarity-based approach, negative evidence therefore decreases the argument 
strength regarding a positive conclusion and a tendency to monotonicity can be expected when 
adding more negative evidence. While research on negative evidence is few and far between, 
results support this general tendency of monotonicity (e.g., Blok et al., 2007; Heussen & 
Hampton, 2011; Osherson et al, 1991). 
In short, evidence seems to raise argument strength if it is positive evidence (i.e., when it 
states that some entity has the property) and to lower it if it is negative evidence (i.e., when it 
states that some entity does NOT have the property), with similarity determining the size of the 
change in argument strength. Hence, argument strength does not seem to move in the opposite 
direction from the “sign” of the evidence. In line with previous research, we call this general 
tendency the Monotonicity Principle about the influence of evidence on argument strength. To 
the extent that theories of inductive reasoning rely on similarity, models of induction endorse the 
Monotonicty principle as presented here (e.g., Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007; Osherson et al., 
1990; Sloman, 1993).  The models can however have other mechanisms that may explain 
violations of the principle (e.g., Osherson et al., 1990); this will be discussed in more detail in the 
General Discussion. 
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 In search of evidence against monotonicity 
On the side of positive evidence, there are some notable violations to the principle (Medin et al, 
2003; Osherson, et al., 1990). These violations of monotonicity seems to be based on using 
additional evidence that comes from a category that is different from the one that includes both 
the original premise and conclusion categories. For example, Osherson et al. (1990) reported that 
a greater proportion of people preferred an argument from Fly to Bee than from Fly and 
Orangutan to Bee. Adding positive evidence from a category (mammals) different to that of the 
conclusion and first premise (insects), seems to elicit a drop in argument strength, thus 
disconfirming the monotonocity principle for positive evidence. A related phenomenon has been 
reported by Medin et al. (2003), who showed that people judged an argument from Polar bear to 
Penguin as stronger than the argument from Polar bear and Brown bear to Penguin. Again, 
adding positive evidence decreases the argument strength, contrary to what the monotonicity 
principle would predict. However, in this case it is the addition of positive evidence from a more 
specific category (bears) than the category including the first premise and the conclusion 
(animals).  
The symmetry between positive (i.e., having a property) and negative evidence (i.e., not 
having a property) suggests that similar violations of the monotonicity principle should be found 
for negative evidence. Moreover, there is evidence from developmental studies that suggests that 
negative evidence or more precisely contrastive information can have a beneficial effect on 
generalizations, at least among children (Kalish & Lawson, 2007; Waxman, Lynch, Casey & 
Baer, 1997). However due to departure from a traditional paradigm in (i) using individuals rather 
than whole classes, (ii) the use of implicit rather than explicit negation and (iii) less than 
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unequivocal results in the adult sample, it is unclear to what extent these findings generalize to a 
standard category-based property induction paradigm within an adult population.  
The present study aims to establish non-monotonicity effects in a standard category-based 
induction task when adding negative evidence to an argument. We do not aim to offer a definitive 
theoretical account of how or why inductive strength can rise with negative evidence, nor are we 
making a universal claim about the circumstance or conditions in which the effect occurs. Rather, 
our aim is to make an existential claim that there are cases in which argument strength can rise by 
finding out about some negative evidence.  
Across three experiments we used a category-based property induction paradigm with 
blank properties—properties that participants are likely to have very little knowledge about. 
Participants made forced choice judgments between (Experiment 1 & 2) or sequentially evaluated 
(Experiment 3) single positive (e.g., Given that freight ships create conversion currents, how 
likely is it that cruise ships do so) and double mixed premise arguments (e.g., Given that freight 
ships create conversion currents, and that hovercraft ships DO NOT, how likely is it that cruise 
ships do so).  
To elicit the effect, we presented participants with exemplars from the same subcategory 
for the positive evidence and the conclusion and used another subcategory for the negative 
evidence. Subcategories are here not to be understood as rigid classes within a fixed taxonomic 
hierarchy. Arctic animals could just as well be a subcategory of animals as felines or canines. The 
use of evidence from different subcategories within a common superordinate category was 
intended to achieve a demarcation of relevant dimensions or criteria for induction.  
Our underlying hypothesis for the three experiments was that a preference for arguments 
containing negative evidence (i.e., a preference for mixed over single premise arguments) will be 
more likely when negative evidence is instantiated by an item from a contrasting subcategory 
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than those of the positive premise and the conclusion. In contrast, if the negative evidence is 
instantiated by an item from the same subcategory the usual negative impact on argument 
strength is expected.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants were asked to choose the stronger of two arguments, one with a 
single positive premise and the identical argument with an additional negative premise.  
       Shostakovich elicits alpha waves. 
Shostakovich elicits alpha waves.   Music of AC/DC does not. 
Bach elicits alpha waves.    Bach elicits alpha waves. 
 
If the Monotonicity Principle is true, adding a negative premise to an argument with a single 
positive premise should in principle not increase argument strength. Hence, participants should 
always choose the single positive premise. Any deviation from preferring the single premise 
argument indicates a violation of the Monotonicity Principle.  
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 32 first year undergraduate students at the University of 
Leuven who each completed a booklet for course credit. 
Design.  In a repeated measures design, participants made forced choice judgments about 
a list of 30 pairs of arguments. Participants were instructed to assume that the premises of the 
arguments are stating facts and asked to make a forced choice for the argument whose premises 
provide better reasons to belief the conclusion. Each pair consisted of a single and a mixed 
premise argument. The mixed premise argument was identical to the single premise argument 
with the exception of an added negative premise. Half of the pairs were target pairs and half were 
control pairs. Two random orders of items were used. 
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Materials.  The premises and the conclusion of each argument contained exemplars from 
a single category (e.g., insects, fruit, wines, car companies). For the target items, the positive 
premise and the conclusion were from one loosely defined subcategory (e.g., flying insects, 
tropical fruit, European wines, German car companies), whereas the negative premise was an 
exemplar from a contrasting subcategory (e.g., crawling insects, Northern European fruit, New 
World wines, Italian car companies). The negative evidence in the control items came from the 
same subcategory as for the positive premise and conclusion. The selection of items from loosely 
defined subcategories was based on the first two authors’ intuitions2. The properties used in the 
arguments were realistic characteristics that participants were likely to have very little knowledge 
about (e.g., produce ocytoncine; have mitochondrion in their cells; create a conversion current). 
A list of the items used in all three experiments can be found in the Appendix. 
Procedure. Students participated in groups and completed the questionnaire as part of a 
series of tasks. The task took no more than 5 minutes. 
Results  
Figure 1 shows the average proportion of responses across 15 target and 15 control items that 
showed a preference for the mixed premise argument containing negative evidence over the 
single positive premise argument.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 1. Average proportion of responses selecting the mixed premise argument for target and 
control items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on the participant data. 
 
An independent sample t-test on the average proportion of participants (t(28) = 6.4, p < 
.001) and a paired-sample t-test on the average proportion of items (t(31) = 6.5, p < .001) showed 
a significant difference (min F’(1, 59) = 20.8, p < .01) between our target and control items in 
response preference for arguments involving negative evidence with both proportions being 
significantly higher than zero (Control: min F’(1, 43) = 28.9, p < .01; Target: minF’(1, 35) = 
74.5, p < .01). Participants were two and a half times more likely to select the argument 
containing negative evidence as stronger among target items than among control items. 
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Preference for negative evidence arguments rose from just under 20% in the control items to 
nearly 50% in the target items.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated in a forced choice paradigm that participants can be tempted into 
preferring an argument that contains negative evidence to those with just a single positive 
premise. This preference was significantly greater when the negative evidence was instantiated 
by an item from a different rather than the same subcategory as that of the positive premise and 
the conclusion. Experiment 1 therefore provides evidence that human reasoning in some cases 
violates the Monotonicity Principle about the influence of negative evidence. Two important 
remarks are in place here, the first concerning the control items, the second relating to the target 
items. We will discuss these in turn. 
Responses for the control items were not at normative levels with nearly 20% of 
responses on average across participants violating the Monotonicity Principle. A plausible 
explanation of this relates to the design characteristics of the study. Participants were asked to 
make 30 forced choice judgments. If the Monotonicity Principle about negative evidence is 
correct, then participants would have had to consistently choose the single premise argument, 
resulting in no legitimate variation in response pattern. Thus one might argue that, through the 
design of the study, participants were somewhat coerced into indicating a preference for the 
mixed premise argument at least for a few of the control items. Experiment 2 will address this 
possibility.  
Nevertheless, the responses to the control items can be seen as the baseline for our target 
items even if they are not located at the normative value. If the baseline preference for arguments 
containing negative evidence in an experimental setup like this is around 20%, then our 
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participants still showed a significantly greater preference for mixed premise arguments among 
target items than among control items. Hence they were sensitive to the similarity between the 
positive and negative premise items in making their choice. 
A second point of discussion relates to the average proportion of responses endorsing the 
negative evidence arguments of the target items, amounting to nearly 50%. One could argue that 
this proportion reflects responses at chance level. It is possible that for the target items, 
participants perceived the strength of single and mixed premise arguments as identical, hence 
making a choice based on a coin flip. If this is the case, the present finding does not support the 
conclusion that adding negative evidence can increase argument strength, but merely shows that 
there are cases in which negative evidence does not lower argument strength. Note that, 
following the Monotonicity Principle, this implies that the negative premise concerns a category 
that is irrelevant—otherwise it would lower argument strength. 
We believe that this is not the case. In order to construct the target items, we chose 
categories that were explicitly similar in a very salient respect (belonging to the same 
superordinate category, e.g., music). Consequently, these categories bear relevance to the 
arguments in question, and following the Monotonicity Principle, should always lower argument 
strength. This prediction is contradicted by the data. Participants were clearly tempted to choose 
the argument that included negative evidence at a rate significantly above zero (the prediction of 
the Monotonicity Principle), and significantly more than the control items (which form an 
empirical baseline). The rise in argument strength provided by the addition of negative evidence 
was not however extremely large, making the choice blatantly clear for the participants.  But 
against a low background expectation of a preference for arguments with negative evidence, the 
level seen was nevertheless high.  
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The following two studies aimed to back this claim by contrasting relevant with irrelevant 
negative evidence (Experiment 2) and by explicitly demonstrating an increase in rated argument 
strength from single to mixed premise arguments within participants (Experiment 3). 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 used a within-subjects design with target and control condition being instantiated 
by different items. In Experiment 2, we replicated the study using a between subjects design in 
order to test whether the manipulation to elicit the effect is robust within items. As before, 
participants were asked to choose between a single premise argument and a mixed premise 
argument (containing a negative premise). Different groups of participants were presented with 
the same positive premise and conclusion but different negative evidence premises that either 
came from a different subcategory as the positive premise and the conclusion (Target), or from 
the same subcategory (Control). In addition, we added a third condition, in which the additional 
evidence was negative but irrelevant (Irrelevant): 
Shostakovich’s music elicits alpha waves. 
A falling rock does not elicit alpha waves. 
Bach’s music elicits alpha waves. 
 
The Irrelevant condition allows us to test whether responses to the target condition in Experiment 
1 constituted chance level responding. Chance level responding in the target condition implies 
that the negative evidence is irrelevant for the conclusion. If the preference for arguments 
containing negative evidence in the irrelevant condition of Experiment 2 can be shown to be 
significantly lower than in the target condition, then responses to the target condition—even if 
they are at .5—can not constitute chance level responding and hence indicate a rise in argument 
strength.   
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Thirty filler items were also constructed to elicit all possible response patterns. Fillers 
remained the same across the three conditions. These two additions counter the potential 
objections we raised in the discussion above. 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 121 first year undergraduate students at the University of 
Leuven who each completed a booklet for course credit. 
Design & Materials.  The task was identical to Experiment 1. Participants were asked to 
judge which of two arguments (a single and a mixed premise) provides better reasons to belief 
the conclusion. A between subjects design was used in which 10 of the target items in 
Experiment 1 (target items that showed the strongest effect) were presented in three different 
conditions—target, control and irrelevant. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
three conditions with roughly 40 participants in each condition. As previously, the target and the 
control condition contained negative evidence from a different or the same subcategory as the 
positive premise and the conclusion, respectively. In addition, an ‘irrelevant’ condition presented 
negative evidence in the form of an exemplar from a different superordinate category than that of 
the positive premise and the conclusion.  
The same thirty filler items were used across the three conditions. These consisted of 10 
purely positive argument pairs (e.g., Lions have enzyme x, tigers have enzyme x. How likely is it 
that cheetahs have enzyme x?) that should clearly elicit a preference for the mixed premise 
argument in order to provide legitimate variation in response choices and 20 argument pairs with 
negative evidence that should elicit a preference for the single premise argument in form similar 
to our control items.  
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Procedure. Students participated in groups and completed the questionnaire as part of a 
series of tasks. The task took no more than 8 minutes. 
Results & Discussion 
In line with Experiment 1, Figure 2 shows the average proportion of responses that indicate a 
preference for mixed premise arguments containing negative evidence over single positive 
premise arguments. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Figure 2. Average proportion of responses selecting the mixed premise argument for target, 
control and irrelevant items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on the 
participant data. 
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A one-way ANOVA across participants and items showed a significant difference in 
preference for mixed premise arguments between conditions, min F’(2, 89) = 7.53, p < .001.  
Planned pair-wise comparison for participants and items showed a significant difference between 
the target and control condition (min F’(1, 42) = 14.35, p < .001) and between target and 
irrelevant (min F’(1, 65) = 4.87, p < .05), but not between irrelevant and control (min F’(1, 48) = 
2.79, p = .102).  
Experiment 2, thus, replicated the findings of Experiment 1 in a between-subjects design 
providing evidence that participants violate the Monotonicity Principle. The same single premise 
arguments were either preferred or rejected depending on the additional negative evidence. 
People showed a greater preference for arguments containing negative evidence when the 
evidence came from a different rather than the same subcategory as the positive premise and the 
conclusion. Furthermore, using irrelevant negative evidence from an unrelated superordinate 
category resulted in responses closer to the control than to the target condition indicating that 
irrelevant evidence in a forced choice paradigm leads to a preference for single premise 
arguments and not coin-flip responding. If the 50% choice for the target arguments in Experiment 
1 had simply reflected a view that the negative premise was irrelevant, then we should have 
observed a similar level of choice for the irrelevant condition in Experiment 2. The significant 
difference between these two conditions therefore rules out this account. 
Experiment 3 
In order to explore this violation of the Monotonicity Principle further, Experiment 3 was 
designed to replicate the effect in a new paradigm. We changed our procedure from a forced 
choice to a sequential judgment task. Participants first evaluated the single premise argument, 
then received the negative premise and evaluated the mixed premise argument.  
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Our predictions were an increase in argument strength from single to mixed premise 
arguments for the target items but not for the control items. The control items should reflect a 
clear drop in argument strength in line with the Monotonicity Principle. Note that in the present 
experiment, we measured the effect within a person and an item, the strongest test for the claim 
that negative evidence can indeed raise argument strength. In addition people were able to 
express the view that the strength was unaffected by giving the same rating to each argument. 
Method 
Participants. Fourteen undergraduate students at the University of Leuven participated for 
course credit.  
Design and Materials. A repeated measures design was used to measure the change in 
argument strength from single to mixed premise arguments. Participants were asked to judge both 
single and mixed premise arguments as well as whether argument strength had decreased, stayed 
unchanged or had increased between the first and second judgment. Judgments of argument 
strength were measured on an 11 point scale. Two random orders of items were used. 
The arguments were identical to those used in Experiment 1. The arguments were 
imbedded in little vignettes describing the first premise as a well-established scientific or 
specialist fact and then asking participants to evaluate the conclusion. Participants then received a 
second piece of information again described as a well-established fact and were asked to evaluate 
whether this lowered, raised or left their judgment of the conclusion unchanged. Subsequently 
they gave a final judgment of the conclusion given both facts.  
Procedure. Participants completed the booklets within an individual testing session.   
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Results & discussion 
Figure 3 shows the average proportion of responses indicating a decrease, no change or increase 
in argument strength from the first to the second judgment for target and control items.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3. Average proportion of responses indicating a change in argument strength from the 
single positive (first judgment) to mixed premise arguments (second judgment) for target and 
control items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on the participant data. 
 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA3 for participants and items revealed a significant interaction between the 
direction of change in people’s judgment (i.e., Decrease, Increase) and Item Type, min F’(1,39) = 
45.3, p < .001. For the target items a greater average proportion of responses across participants 
and items indicated an increase rather than a decrease in argument strength from the first to the 
second judgment (min F’(1,26) = 5.8, p < .05), whereas for the control items the reverse pattern 
was found (min F’(1,26) = 37.5, p < .001). Although for the target items the greatest proportion 
of items did not change in strength, indicating that negative evidence for those items was 
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perceived as irrelevant, the average proportion of responses indicating an increase was 
significantly larger for the target items than for the control items (Target: M = 0.34, sd = 0.19; 
Control: M = 0.06, sd = 0.07; minF’(1,36) = 22.7, p < .001).  
This pattern of results was also reflected in the ratings of the single and mixed premise 
arguments. Figure 4 shows the average argument strength of single positive and mixed premise 
arguments for target and control items. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 4. Average argument strength of single positive (first judgment) and mixed premise 
arguments (second judgment). Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on the 
participant data. 
 
A 2 × 2 ANOVA for participants and items revealed a significant interaction between the 
Type of Argument (levels: Single premise vs. Mixed premise arguments) and Item Type (levels: 
Target vs. Control items), min F’(1,39) = 38.8, p < .001. Target items showed a significant 
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increase in argument strength from single to mixed premise arguments (min F’(1,26) = 7.0, p < 
.05), whereas control items showed a significant decrease (min F’(1,25) = 33.9, p < .001). 
Among the single premise arguments, target and control items did not show a significant 
difference in argument strength (Item: F(1,13) = 6.2, p < .05; Participant: F(1,28) = 2.7, p = 
0.114; minF’(1,41) = 1.9, p = 0.178). These results confirm our contention that it is possible to 
increase argument strength by introducing negative evidence. 
Experiment 3 tested the Monotonicity Principle in a sequential evaluation task within 
items and participants and hence constitutes the most stringent of the three studies. Although the 
majority of people indicated no change in ratings of our target items between the first and the 
second judgment, a significant proportion did indicate an increase4. If the results of Experiment 1 
& 2 constituted coin-flip responding on the grounds that the negative premise was irrelevant and 
did not change the argument, here we should have seen very few responses indicating the 
Increase option, and almost all responses indicating the No Change option. Experiment 3 does 
not seem to support this view. To the contrary, in line with the proportions, average ratings of the 
target items went up significantly from the single to the mixed premise arguments providing clear 
evidence for a rise in argument strength. In contrast, the control items showed a substantial 
decrease in argument strength.  
General Discussion 
Imagine you want to test the proposition that ‘all ravens are black’. There are two related 
hypotheses that need to hold for the proposition to be true. One is ‘if it’s a raven, then it is black’. 
And the second is,  ‘if it’s not black, then it’s not a raven’. Intuitively, seeing something that is a 
raven and that is black confirms the hypothesis ‘if it’s a raven, then it is black’. But similarly 
seeing something that is not black and not a raven confirms the hypothesis ‘if it’s not black, then 
it’s not a raven’. Hempel (1945) demonstrated the logical equivalence of these two hypotheses, 
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showing that evidence that supports one hypothesis logically provides support for the other. 
Hence, based on formal logic, encountering a ‘white swan’ is confirmatory evidence for the 
proposition ‘all ravens are black’. But as Hempel argued and most readers would agree, this 
seems counterintuitive and hence poses a paradox between formal logic and intuition (Hempel, 
1945).  
Hempel’s paradox depends on what we called the Monotonicity Principle of the influence 
of evidence. In the present paper, however, we have demonstrated that it is possible to raise 
argument strength by providing negative evidence. There are arguments in which figuratively 
speaking ‘seeing a white swan’ does provide evidence for the conclusion ‘all ravens are black’. 
Although this finding does undermine the paradox at the side of intuition, as such it does not 
eliminate the paradox. According to logic, any non-black non-raven provides support for the 
conclusion ‘all ravens are black’ and that is clearly not the case. More modestly, our finding 
highlights the need for an account that is able to differentiate between negative evidence that 
lowers and negative evidence that raises credence in the conclusion of an argument. Such an 
account would provide a psychological demarcation of Hempel’s paradox.  
Models of induction and non-monotonicity 
The present findings not only have implications for Hempel’s paradox but raise an important 
question concerning existing models of induction, namely, how to incorporate the influence of 
negative evidence. To date, most models of induction have focused on the influence of positive 
evidence (e.g., Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 1993) with only two models providing 
an explicit formulation of the influence of negative evidence (Blok, Medin & Osherson, 2007; 
Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009). In order to provide some comparison of the main models we’ll 
make minimal assumptions on how negative evidence could be implemented. While an elaborate 
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presentation of the models and possible adaptations to account for our results falls outside the 
scope of this contribution, a model-based analysis of the present finding can lead to a better 
understanding of the present phenomenon.  
Feature-based induction model 
The feature-based induction model (FBIM: Sloman, 1993) derives the strength of a conclusion 
from the association between existing and novel features that is built from the evidence in the 
premises. Generalization therefore increases as similarity increases. While FBIM is not 
formulated for negative evidence, assuming the symmetry of having-a-property and not-having-a-
property, the model’s predictions are in line with the Monotonicity principle and hence cannot 
handle our findings.  
SimProb   
In the SimProb model (Blok, Medin & Osherson, 2007), a judgment of argument strength is 
conceptualized as a conditional probability judgment that relates the prior probability of a 
conclusion to the relevance of the evidence (by degree of similarity) and the degree to which the 
evidence is surprising (by prior probability of the evidence). The SimProb model explicitly 
allows for negative evidence premises, yet does not allow a rise in argument strength following 
the addition of a negative premise. According to the SimProb model, relevant evidence will raise 
argument strength if it is positive  and lower argument strength if it is negative. As such, the 
model endorses the Monotonicity principle and hence cannot handle the present findings. 
Similarity-Coverage model 
The well-known similarity-coverage model (SimCov: Osherson et al., 1990) relates the strength 
of an argument to two similarity-based components. First, the similarity between the premise and 
conclusion categories plays an important role. In its present formulation the model does not 
incorporate negative evidence, however assuming a symmetry between having-a-property and 
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not-having-a-property leads to model predictions that are necessarily in line with the 
Monotonicity principle. In other words, the similarity term cannot accommodate a raise in 
argument strength due to negative evidence5.  
The second component that can influence argument strength according to the SimCov 
model is the coverage term, which reflects the extent to which an immediately relevant 
superordinate category is “covered” by the premise categories. Coverage is operationalized by 
computing the average maximum similarity of the premise categories to other members of the 
nearest superordinate category that includes premises and conclusion. Interestingly, the coverage 
component is crucial in explaining non-monotonicity effects for strictly positive premises 
(Osherson et al., 1990), due to changes in the relevant superordinate category for the argument 
(see Introduction).  
If we assume that in the single premise arguments (e.g., Shostakovich Æ Bach) people 
rely on the broader basic-level category (e.g., MUSIC) as the immediate superordinate in the 
coverage term, the addition of the negative premise (e.g, AC/DC does not have the property) 
forces a change of the-to-be-covered category to a lower subcategory (e.g., CLASSICAL 
MUSIC). The latter, more specific category, is clearly better covered by the positive premise 
category. Therefore, adding the negative evidence may actually raise argument strength because 
the positive premise provides greater coverage for the more specific subcategory (i.e., 
CLASSICAL MUSIC) compared to the more general basic level category (i.e., MUSIC). 
Presented like this, the observed effect is a negative evidence variant of the non-monotonicity 
effect described by Osherson et al.  
Note however, that this assumes that the coverage term only covers the positive premise 
and conclusion categories and not the negative premise categories. Furthermore, according to 
SimCov, people turn to the most specific superordinate category that includes both premise and 
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conclusion categories. It is therefore unclear why in the case of negative evidence the basic level 
(e.g., MUSIC) should be considered the to-be-covered category for single positive premise 
arguments. Moreover, even if changing the to-be-covered category was the mechanism to deal 
with negative evidence that raises argument strength, it is then unclear how the SimCov model 
would handle our control items, in which the negative evidence that is at the same hierarchical 
level as both the positive premise and the conclusion lowers argument strength.  
Bayesian approaches  
In the Bayesian approach to inductive reasoning, it is assumed that people make optimal 
inferences based on prior hypotheses about the distribution of the novel feature and the evidence 
provided through the premises (e.g., Heit, 1998; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). Every hypothesis 
about a novel feature can be formulated as the extension of the feature, i.e., which categories 
have it and which categories do not. The prior probability of such a hypothesis reflects the prior 
belief that the corresponding feature extension is correct, relative to other hypotheses. As 
evidence is observed (the premise), the probability of the hypotheses is updated following Bayes’ 
rule, and the probability, that a specific category has the property, is updated accordingly. 
A Bayesian inference mechanism as such does not exclude that negative evidence raises 
the strength of an argument, given a right set of prior probabilities for the relevant hypotheses. To 
raise argument strength with negative evidence, the priors of the hypotheses require a strong a 
priori clustering of the positive premise and the conclusion category. In other words, hypotheses 
that the feature extends only to the positive premise and conclusion categories and not to the 
negative premise should be likely a priori (i.e., before the premises are considered). Moreover, 
hypotheses that do not endorse this clustering should receive a low prior, for instance, hypotheses 
that all categories have the property or that only the positive premise category has it, or any 
combination of categories from the positive and negative set. Given these priors, the posterior 
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probability that the conclusion category has the property can increase when considering the 
negative premise. 
Another way of looking at it is to consider an exhaustive hypothesis space. For instance, 
for the ‘elicitation of alpha waves among music’ one might have a set of hypotheses consisting of 
“noise in general elicits alpha waves”, “only music does”, “only classical music does” or “it only 
applies to Shostakovich”. Negative evidence may help in reducing the number of hypotheses by 
explicitly contradicting some of them (e.g., not all music elicits alpha waves). Furthermore 
evidence from concept learning suggests that negative evidence even constrains the generation of 
hypotheses already at the outset of learning (Houtz, Moore, & Davis, 1973). Assuming a 
probability distribution over these hypotheses would imply an increase in probability of any of 
these hypotheses when excluding another hypothesis. In the example above, introducing negative 
evidence that excludes the noise and music in general hypotheses would hence lead to an increase 
in likelihood for the remaining two hypotheses. Whether this increase is large enough to replicate 
our empirical findings depends on the prior probabilities of each of the hypotheses.  
The question then becomes how to arrive at the right prior probabilities. The priors can be 
considered an implementation of prior knowledge that people have regarding the domain and 
feature that form the topic of the argument. Heit (1998) proposes that the prior probability for 
each hypothesis depends on the number of familiar properties that can be retrieved from memory, 
and have the same extension as the hypothesis proposes: the extension of a novel feature is likely 
if its distribution resembles that of many already-known properties.  It is, however, not 
immediately obvious whether a process of sampling properties can result in priors that reflect the 
strong clustering of categories necessary to raise the argument strength with negative evidence.  
Another fruitful approach to the question about priors has been provided by the structured 
statistical models approach (Kemp et al., 2009; Tenenbaum, Kemp & Shafto, 2007). They 
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propose that the priors for the Bayesian inference derive from a stochastic process that operates 
on a knowledge structure. The knowledge structure (e.g., a causal food web or a taxonomic tree) 
captures the structure in the world that is informative for a certain argument, for instance, the 
taxonomic relations for inferences regarding properties in animals. If we assume a similarity 
representation (a tree representation or a spatial representation) and a diffusion process that 
distributes a feature smoothly over the structure (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009), as seems 
appropriate for the present task, the model predictions follow the Monotonicity Principle and 
hence cannot explain our present findings.6 This is not to say that no combination of knowledge 
structure and stochastic process exists that is able to supply appropriate priors for raising 
argument strength with negative evidence: The structured statistical models approach is a 
framework that allows many specific instantiations, however speculating which of these are able 
to account for the present findings falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Relevance theory 
An approach that is not formalized but may provide a process acount to explain the present 
finding is the relevance theory of induction (Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003). The basic 
idea is that distinctive properties of the premise categories highlight relevant dimensions for 
induction. These dimensions are then either reinforced (in case of a match) or undermined (in 
case of a mismatch) by comparing the premises with the conclusion. Negative evidence may 
work at this process of reinforcement or undermining. If people find a relevant dimension for 
induction (e.g., classical music) that is common to the positive premise and the conclusion, 
negative evidence can either undermine or reinforce the validity of the dimension. The validity of 
a dimension is undermined when negative evidence shares that dimension with the positive 
premise and the conclusion (e.g., Haydn doesn’t elicit alpha waves, thus classical music cannot 
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be the basis for induction) and reinforced when it does not share that dimension (e.g., AC/DC 
does not elicit alpha waves but AC/DC is not classical music). Whether negative evidence that 
reinforces a dimension is then considered relevant enough to increase argument strength depends 
on whether the negative evidence increases the salience of the dimension sufficiently above what 
it would have been without the negative evidence. In other words, the likelihood of a 
generalization from Shostakovich to Bach will increase with the introduction of negative 
evidence, if the negative evidence raises the salience of classical music as a basis for induction.  
How might that happen? The relevance approach suggests that both the level of effort 
necessary to process an input and the effect that such an input has, affect the relevance of the 
input (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Hence, if the negative evidence lowers the effort necessary to 
draw out the dimension used for induction, then inductive strength may increase. Furthermore, 
inductive strength may increase, if the introduction of negative evidence highlights a particular 
dimension that brings about a stronger effect than a dimension that had been considered before 
the introduction of negative evidence.  
This proposal is clearly only a rough sketch of a possible mechanism by which negative 
evidence may increase argument strength. As pointed out by Medin et al. (2003), the concepts of 
effect and effort are notoriously vague, hence making a formalization of the relevance approach a 
difficult task. However, the effect presented here with its proposed mechanisms within the 
framework of relevance, offers another way to test the relevance account of induction. Future 
studies may want to test whether the introduction of negative evidence can  indeed highlight a 
dimension for induction that would otherwise not have been considered. Likewise it is an 
empirical question whether negative evidence can lower the effort necessary to identify a relevant 
basis for induction. 
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Conclusion 
The present paper provides empirical evidence for the idea that negative evidence can increase 
argument strength. These findings constitute a new phenomenon of category-based property 
induction that models of induction need to be able to accommodate.  
In their current form there are only two models of induction that can explicitly incorporate 
negative evidence (Blok et al., 2007; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009). Employing minimal 
assumptions, we have offered a brief overview of the main models and discussed whether or how 
they could incorporate our findings. Those models solely based on the underlying similarity 
relations between premises and conclusion seem to have a hard time accounting for the increase 
in argument strength. Bayesian models are better able to accommodate the phenomenon, however 
they require a specific distribution of prior probabilities across hypotheses in order to explain the 
effect. Thus the onus is on them to provide a reasonable mechanism that would result in these 
priors. The relevance theory provides an intuitive process account of how the present effect may 
come about. However, relevance theory is only a framework account that is not formalized. The 
relatively vague concepts of effort and effect afford a larger degree of flexibility and can hence 
easily accommodate a range of phenomena.  
Phenomena like the one presented here provide the opportunity to challenge underlying 
assumptions of models of induction. Deriving mechanisms to accommodate these findings leads 
to new predictions that in turn provide tests of the models. The common goal of all models of 
induction is to provide a sensible way to define the relevance of evidence for a conclusion. The 
violation of the Monotonicity Principle for negative evidence constitutes a clear constraint on 
models of induction and again highlights the importance of getting a clearer grasp of what 
determines the relevance of evidence—be it positive or negative.  
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Appendix: Items used in Experiments 1 & 3 
 
    Positive Premise   Negative Premise   Conclusion 
Exp. 1
N=32 
Exp. 3
N=14 
Exp. 3 
Positive 
Exp. 3
Mixed 
Grouping 
task 
Ta
rg
et
 It
em
s 
French wine,  ¬Australian wine  → Italian wine  0.16  0.14  6.43  6.36  0.43 
Rabbit,  ¬Hedgehog  → Squirrel  0.25  0.29  7.00  6.79  0.43 
BMW,  ¬Fiat  → Mercedes  0.28  0.29  6.71  6.64  0.93 
Duck,  ¬Sparrow  → Swan  0.38  0.36  7.07  7.79  0.57 
Flute,  ¬Guitar  → Trumpet  0.47  0.29  5.36  6.07  0.50 
Rubens,  ¬Dali  → Van Eyck  0.50  0.21  4.79  4.50  0.93 
Actor,  ¬Librarian  → Politician  0.50  0.43  4.86  5.86  0.79 
Freight ship,  ¬Hovercraft  → Cruise ship  0.50  0.57  7.00  8.07  0.93 
Atlantic,  ¬Lake Balaton  → Mediterranean  0.50  0.29  5.71  6.36  0.86 
Window glass,  ¬Bottle glass  → Car glass  0.53  0.14  5.43  5.57  0.86 
Polar bear,  ¬Bison  → Penguins  0.53  0.57  7.07  8.29  1.00 
Mozart,  ¬AC/DC  → Bach  0.59  0.36  6.43  7.07  1.00 
Moth,  ¬Spider  → Fly  0.63  0.21  5.64  6.07  0.93 
LCD TV,  ¬Old TV set  → Plasma screen  0.69  0.57  6.64  7.86  0.43 
Strawberry,  ¬Banana  → Raspberry  0.75  0.43  6.86  7.36  0.93 
Co
nt
ro
l I
te
m
s 
Guitarist,  ¬Basguitarist  → Violinist  0.06  0.00  7.71  4.50  0.00 
Laptop PC,  ¬Palmtop PC  → Calculator  0.06  0.14  5.50  3.57  0.14 
Air gun,  ¬Sniper rifle  → Hunting rifle  0.13  0.21  6.43  6.07  0.79 
Ant,  ¬Termite  → Bee  0.13  0.00  4.64  3.43  0.50 
Potato,  ¬Beet  → Carrot  0.13  0.07  5.50  4.14  0.43 
Horse,  ¬Cow  → Goat   0.13  0.00  5.36  2.71  0.36 
Papaya,  ¬Star fruit  → Mango  0.16  0.00  5.93  5.21  0.43 
F16,  ¬Concorde  → Boeing  0.19  0.07  6.21  4.43  0.29 
Oak,  ¬Willow  → Beech  0.19  0.07  5.07  4.07  0.57 
Swordfish,  ¬Ray  → Tuna  0.19  0.00  5.00  4.21  0.64 
Stork,  ¬Crow  → Goose  0.22  0.07  6.00  4.07  0.79 
Picasso,  ¬Magritte  → Warhol   0.28  0.07  5.43  3.93  0.71 
Lion,  ¬Coyote  → Crocodile  0.28  0.00  5.00  3.71  0.71 
Tripel beer,  ¬Dubbel beer  → Duvel beer  0.31  0.00  6.21  4.71  0.64 
Snake,  ¬Wasp  → Scorpion  0.31  0.21  5.93  5.50  0.50 
 
Note. Columns headed Exp. 1 & 3 contain the proportion of people indicating a preference for arguments 
containing negative evidence. The columns headed positive and mixed show the ratings of single positive and 
mixed premise arguments on a scale from zero to ten. The last column shows the proportion of participants (N = 
14) who selected the positive premise and the conclusion in a grouping task.  
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Appendix: Proportion of people preferring arguments containing negative evidence. Item scores 
for each condition in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 Positive Premise   Negative Premise   Conclusion 
Target 
N=41 
Control 
N=41 
Irrelevant
N=39 
Ta
rg
et
 It
em
s 
Rubens,  ¬Dali  → Van Eyck  0.37  0.22  0.23 
Actors,  ¬Librarian  → Politicians  0.39  0.07  0.21 
Freight ship,  ¬Hovercraft  → Cruise ship  0.41  0.17  0.31 
Atlantic,  ¬Lake Balaton  → Mediterranean  0.27  0.05  0.15 
Window glass,  ¬Bottle glass  → Car glass  0.34  0.34  0.28 
Polar bear,  ¬Bison  → Penguin  0.54  0.27  0.33 
Mozart,  ¬AC/DC  → Bach  0.66  0.10  0.44 
Moth,  ¬Spider  → Fly  0.37  0.12  0.33 
LCD TV,  ¬Old TV set  → Plasma screen  0.66  0.37  0.31 
Strawberry,  ¬Banana  → Raspberry  0.34  0.02  0.36 
 
Note. Columns contain the proportion of people indicating a preference for arguments containing negative 
evidence in each condition. Sample size for each condition is given at the top.  
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Footnote 
1. In fact, rather than using explicit negation, negative evidence is sometimes 
implemented as having another type of property (e.g., Kalish & Lawson, 2007). 
2. In order to test the authors’ intuition participants performed an additional grouping 
task in Experiment 3. Participants were asked to circle the two exemplars out of the 
triplet present in the argument that belong together. In the appendix, the last 
column of the table shows the proportion of participant indicating the first premise 
and the conclusion as the grouped pair. For the target condition, 10 out of 15 items 
had the majority of participants (around .8 and above) select the first premise and 
conclusion as the grouped pair (overall average .77 for the target condition). In 
contrast, across items the average proportion of people selecting the first premise 
and conclusion for the control condition was .5. 
3. The No-change responses were omitted from the analyses to avoid violations of the 
independence assumption of ANOVA.  
4. Although we restrict ourselves in referring to the effect on people’s preferences, the 
effect held across both people and items as indicated by the minF’ analyses. 
5. Furthermore the similarity component uses the maximum similarity of all premises 
to the conclusion. In mixed premise arguments, the sign of the similarity 
component would hence depend on whether the positive or the negative premise is 
more similar to the conclusion leading to unnatural patterns of data (Heussen, 
Voorspoels & Storms, 2010). 
6. Also, contrary to the non-monotonicity effects when adding positive evidence 
(Kemp et al, 2009; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001), varying sampling assumptions 
(strong or weak sampling, the size principle) does not explain the present findings. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Average proportion of responses selecting the mixed premise argument for target 
and control items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on the 
participant data. 
Figure 2. Average proportion of responses selecting the mixed premise argument for 
target, control and irrelevant items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals 
calculated on the participant data. 
Figure 3. Average proportion of responses indicating a change in argument strength from 
the single positive (first judgment) to mixed premise arguments (second judgment) for 
both control and target items. Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on 
the participant data. 
Figure 4. Average argument strength of single positive (first judgment) and mixed premise 
arguments (second judgment). Error bars constitute 95% confidence intervals calculated on 
the participant data. 
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